





30 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

25X1 VIA:  
Director, Program Assessment Office

25X1 FROM:  
Program Assessment Office

SUBJECT: Status of Navy STOF Follow-on Work (U)

1. This memorandum describes our current thinking on the questions raised by the Navy STOF report--primarily questions of warning. You will easily note some frustration in our attempts to relate these questions to programmatic issues. (U)

2. Recall that the conceptual measure of merit was how national intelligence helped achieve the objectives described in the Navy STOF study; namely, NCA decisions on redeployment of forces and rules-of-engagement (ROE) modification in preparation for war, or sustained forward deployment for peacetime presence. Two preliminary thoughts will help to focus the ensuing remarks:

a. The I&W literature differentiates between warning of attack by the USSR (also PRC and North Korea), called Big "W", and warning of Third World crises, little "w". Land forces place high priority on Big "W" for obvious reasons. So do Navy conventional forces but in a different way. An explicit assumption in the Navy STOF report is that some Navy forces will be forward deployed in a face-to-face scenario as hostilities become imminent. An implicit assumption is that these forces are so deployed in reaction to a Third World crisis--for peacetime presence or limited intervention. There is no apparent use for face-to-face deployment for presence in a Big "W" scenario that is not precipitated by lesser crises. Accordingly, confrontations between superpower navies are most apt to be consequences of Third World crises and little "w" applies.

b. Peacetime presence of Navy conventional forces in third world crises is an option routinely exercised by the NCA. Little "w" can help Navy only if the NCA is disposed to seek other options as a crisis heightens. A clear alternative--the one routinely exercised by the NCA either by design or default--is to put Navy in the position of a tripwire for Big "W". (S)

25X1

SUBJECT: Status of Navy STOF Follow-on Work

3. Our current efforts are bent on (1) modeling an ideal I&W process, (focused on little "w"), (2) modeling the existing I&W process, and (3) describing the difference between the two and the programmatic that would reduce the difference. (U)

4. Our model of the ideal process is still fragmented and highly conceptual, but improving. We reviewed the research literature on crisis warning and management to determine whether there is an analytical base on which to structure our ideal system. Most parts can be found in the literature, but the state of the art is similar to the state of economic analysis 20 years ago. An early conclusion we made was that our Navy-oriented measures of merit can be broadened to a more appropriate measure--the lead time provided to the NCA, through little "w," to forecast for crises and and to develop and execute options. Viewing Navy crises as a subset of the larger class, the choice about redeployment from peacetime presence and ROE modification becomes a function of lead time available to understand the trade-offs among these and other options and to implement the one selected. (U)

5. To increase lead time available, the I&W system within the national intelligence community should move towards ADP assisted filtering and collating of the blizzard of data available to military, political and economic analysts. With this, patterns and trends can be established over time for daily monitoring. This would do two things:

--Provide direct support to the I&W center analyst. (A small developmental effort in the NMIC structure, Advanced Indications System (AIS), is an isolated example of this.)

--Establish over time a data base which could be studied to identify correlations among anomalous data patterns and actual historical events. A [] indicator system, which forecasts readiness more than intent, would emerge and become the focus of daily monitoring to identify areas of increased likelihood of crisis. The I&W community (e.g., through the NITO for Warning) could then focus collectors on the identified areas to discern political intent to precipitate crisis. [] are isolated projects that identify and track indicators for Big "W." [] developmental and lacks consensus in the I&W community.) (S)

6. In the ideal system, procedures would be established and practiced by which the information collected by deployed military forces--the prime source of on-scene intelligence--gets entered into the decisionmaking process, e.g., by the I&W system. This link is essential if the NCA elects to exercise tactical control and if options for redeployment and ROE modification are to be considered. For Navy, a prime candidate for this link is []

SECRET

SUBJECT: Status of Navy STOF Follow-on Work

7. In the ideal world the NCA decisionmaking community would be able to use the output of the intelligence community to make decisions. To do this the NCA needs a fundamental understanding of the I&W processes that provided the report of increased likelihood of crisis. If the process is deemed valid, the ambiguities inherent in crisis warning might be less of an impediment to NCA initiation of a planning process. The NCA might choose to initiate political signals to test the will of crisis participants. If so, the I&W community should be advised so that intelligence tasking can be better focused on indicators relevant to NCA planning: reactions by the crisis participants--for use in development of further options. Thus for the I&W process to be useful, the NCA must understand it and be involved in it. (C)

25X1 8. Modeling the existing I&W process has been an exercise in frustration. First, the NCA is not nearly as involved as in the ideal case, perhaps from lack of confidence in the process. Second, although there is an occasional activity relevant to the ideal [redacted], the I&W mainstream is just monitoring events, often through review of hardcopy traffic, in search of an event which is tantamount to a crisis. Whatever forecasting process there is resides in the mind of the analyst. The I&W analyst himself is a current intelligence analyst temporarily assigned to the I&W mission. His rewards are derived from his current intelligence products (the "publish or perish" mindset). I&W offers mostly penalties for reporting errors. In summary, the difference between the current process and an ideal process, ours or anyone else's, is vast. (S)

9. Given our state of understanding of the ideal model and the current system, our thoughts on possible programmatic issues must be considered highly tentative. At the moment, we are trying to understand how we could serve as a catalyst for change. Our emphasis is on improving data management and systematic production within I&W centers and encouraging NCA interest in the I&W process. These ends could be served by:

25X1 --Encouraging the occasional example of relevant activity [redacted] [redacted] by providing the resources the project leaders request, e.g., very modest increases in manpower.

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--Providing our thoughts to the NIO for Warning and discussing with him the HPSCI request for a DCI report by 31 December 1979 on the effectiveness of the entire intelligence process in providing warning. This report could be used to focus the community on the issue. (S)

10. In summary, we conclude that the I&W community is not a system and lacks a well-defined process. The way to apply RMS leverage to the problem has not yet been found, but the search continues. (C)

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SUBJECT: Status of Navy STOF Follow-on Work

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